

# The Angolan Civil War and the American Position in 1993

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## ABSTRACT

The study has examined the Angolan civil war in 1993, and reference was made to the period during which the Angolan civil war broke out from 1975-1992. It is a long conflict that no other African country had ever witnessed.

The research has also examined the extension of the Angolan civil war during the year 1993, in which continuous battles took place between the UNITA organization and the MPLA government, and the international community's attempts to stop the conflict. All peace initiatives failed. The study also observed the attitude of the United States of America towards the war. America two fold a double policy towards Angola which was the cause behind the continuity of the war. However its position witnessed a change in the second half of 1993 towards the two parties of the conflict to preserve its economic interests.

**KEYWORDS:** Angola, Angola war, American intervention in Angola, Africa.

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## INTRODUCTION

Exposure to the study of the Angolan civil war and the American position in 1993 is an important topic that deserves to be studied, due to the importance of Angola in terms of its strategic location, and because it witnessed the longest civil war in the African continent since it erupted since 1975, and international intervention in it was a major reason for its continuation, and the war left its mark. Dangerous to Angolan society. The research problem revolves around the Angolan civil war to understand the backgrounds of this war, the development of its events during the year 1993 and the reasons for its continuation, also the role of US policy in it. Thus in light of these several questions crystallized that I tried to answer through the presentation namely: Why did the Angolan civil war erupted after it was stopped according to Bicesse agreement? The reasons that led to its continuation despite the pressure of the international community to stop it? What was the US position on the Angolan civil war in 1993?. And why did the US position towards the two parties of the conflict change?.

The research study aims is to review the latest Angolan civil war in 1993 and highlight the developments of the war between the two parties of the conflict, in addition to highlighting the position of the United States of America and its impact on the development of events in Angola after the end of the cold

war, as for the importance of the research lies in the lack of Arab academic studies and research that dealt with Angola as if it was a forgotten country by historians because of the difficulty in obtaining the resources due to its lack and because it is in many foreign languages.

The research relied on the historical method and highlights its importance in dealing with contemporary events by relying on past events. It also helps provide the opportunity to re-evaluate current events by linking them to the past. The research also relied on the descriptive analysis approach to describe events and stand on the purpose of analyzing them to know the circumstances that led to their occurrence by. Understanding of the characteristics, features and problems surrounding it.

As for the structure of the study, it included an introduction and two topics, the introduction to the bearing of the Angolan civil war 1975-1992, in which it showed the outbreak of the civil war during the period 1975-1992, in which it referred to international intervention in it within the framework of the cold war, which contributed to its emergence and continuation, and the failure to implement the 1992 Bicesse agreement, which led to the outbreak of the civil war at the end of 1992, while the first topic was titled the Angolan civil war 1993, in which I explained the developments of the civil war and the peace

attempts to cease fire and the impact the war had on the country. The US administration's policy toward the war in 1993 between UNITA and the MPLA government, which was characterized a duality.

The research relied on a number of important foreign sources. Including a book, orphan of the cold war the inside story of the collapse of the Angolan peace process 1992-1993, by Margaret Joan Anstee, the importance of this book comes from the author was an eyewitness on the developments that occurred in Angola, as she was the head of the United Nations mission in Angola, the book had enriched the research with important information in several aspects. Other sources are: Angola a modern military history 1961-2002 by Stephen L. Weigert, which is one of the important books because the writer is a contemporary of Angolan events, again this book enriched the research with valuable information in several aspects. In addition the research had relied on other foreign sources that enriched the research with information in several aspects due to the valuable information it carried.

#### **Preface: The Angolan civil war 1975-1992.**

Angola is located in southern part of the African continent. It is bordered by the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) to the north, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the northeast, Namibia, to the Southern, Zambia to the southern east and the Atlantic Ocean with 1,600 km long coastline to the west<sup>(1)</sup>.

The official language is Portuguese, in addition to the local dialects that are currently spoken, which are Umbundu, Kimbundu, Kioku, Kwanuha, Kikongo, Ngangela and Chokwi.<sup>(2)</sup> Angolan society includes several ethnic groups that differ from each other by their language and culture, but most of these belong to four main ethno linguistic groups, namely<sup>(3)</sup> Ovimbundu, Umbundu Bakongo,

and Cokwe.<sup>(4)</sup> The country's name is taken from the name of Ngola, the leader of Mbundu tribe, who managed to unify its tribes and established kingdom of Ndongo<sup>(5)</sup>.

Portugal turned its attention to Angola since the beginning of the geographical exploration movement for the abundance of its resources and it was able to control the coastal areas in 1575 after battles with the Kingdom of Ndongo.<sup>(6)</sup> During the period of Portuguese colonialism, three movements appeared in Angola, namely: The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FANLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The Fur that occurred with the three movements in January 1975 and set the date for independence in 11<sup>th</sup> November of the same year. The Angolan civil war broke out between the three movements at the beginning of 1975 in order to gain authority<sup>(7)</sup> UNITA and FANLA fought together, with American and Western countries support, against the MPLA movement, which obtained the support of the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist countries. It achieved victory and was able to seize power in 11<sup>th</sup> November 1975 however the war continued. In 1976 the United States of America stopped supporting. The FANLA movement did not achieve victory, and its leader Holden Roberto, was forced to abandon the conflict with the MPLA government, and his movement turned into a party opposed to the Angolan government, but UNITA led by Jonas Savimbi, insisted on continuing the conflict. America

against white minority rule, Oxford University Press, London, 1972, p.200; Leroy Vail, The Creation of tribalism in Southern Africa, Berkeley, London, 1989, p.380.

(4) David Seddon and Daniel Seddon Daines, A political and economic dictionary of Africa, Routledge Haines House, London, 2005, p.33.

(5) Lawrence W. Henderson, Angola: Five centuries of conflict, Cornell University Press, London, 1979, p.81; Joseph C. Miller, op. cit, pp. 58-64.

(6) David Abshire and Michael Samuels, Portuguese African, Pluto Press, London, 1969, p.176.

(7) Khalaf Obaid Hamood, Angolan Political Developments 1992, Palarch's Journal Of Archaeology Of Egypt /Egyptology, Vol .17, No .3, ( 15 April 2020), Netherlands , P.2603.

(1) Robert I. Rotberg, Angola , Harding House publishing, Harvard, 2002, pp.11-12.

(2) Guus Meijer, from military peace to social justice: The Angolan peace process, Conciliation Resources, London, 2004, p.4 ; Joseph C. Miller, Kings and Kinsmen early Mbundu states in Angola, Oxford University Press, London, 1976, pp.37-40.

(3) Richard Gibson, African liberation movements: contemporary struggles

and a number of its allies supported it and this fueled the continuation of the conflict until the collapse of the Union Soviet 1991<sup>(1)</sup> and as a result negotiations took place under the custody of Portugal in Bicesse which lies southern Portugal. Negotiations had ended on the 31<sup>st</sup> of May 1991 with the conclusion of Bicesse agreement signed by Dos Santos, President of the Republic of Angola, and Jonas Savimbi leader of UNITA, under the supervision of the Portuguese government, in the presence of representatives from the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and the United Nations. This agreement had stipulated the following items: <sup>(2)</sup> The commitment of the Soviet Union and U.S.A not to interfere in Angolan internal affairs, not to sell weapons to the conflicting parties, and the custom of "triple zero". And the commitment of the Angolan government and UNITA to ceasefire, whereas UNITA had to recognize the Angolan government. In return the government will recognize UNITA as a democratic political party.<sup>(3)</sup> Demobilization of both side's forces, and formation a new national army consisted of forty thousand fighters, divided between them, before the election. Holding free and democratic elections during the 29<sup>th</sup> - 30<sup>th</sup> of September 1992, whereas the winning party will form a new government, and the exchange of prisoners of the two parties under the supervision of the International Committee of Red Cross<sup>(4)</sup>.

It was decided to implement the agreement under the supervision of the three troika countries the United States of America, Russian and Portugal, and a United Nations force, in cooperation with a joint committee from UNITA and the MPLA government.<sup>(5)</sup>

Despite reaching an agreement, U.S.A did not recognize the Angolan government, and Jonas Savimbi continued agreement's violating several times during 1991, while UNITA continued to kill some government officials, and carried out bombings and clashed with government forces in several places throughout the country, as well as it did not surrender its weapons<sup>(6)</sup>.

Moreover the provisions of the Bicesse agreement were not implemented during 1991 and 1992, especially the demobilization of the Angolan government's army and the UNITA army, also the formation of a national army equally, and UNITA forces did not withdraw from the territories they control and hand them over to government forces to maintain security there before the election date arrives.<sup>(7)</sup> Also the release of all prisoners on both sides was not implemented because UNITA did not release all the prisoners despite the Angolan government releasing all UNITA prisoners.<sup>(8)</sup> The elections took place on the specified date in 29<sup>th</sup>-30<sup>th</sup> September 1992, in which 18 political parties participated, which did not have a prominent role in the elections. The main competition was limited between UNITA and MPLA.<sup>(9)</sup> As a result MPLA won 49.57% of the vote, and UNITA got 40.7% and according to that result, MPLA won 54% of the seats in the legislature, in return for that, UNITA won 34%.<sup>(10)</sup> In 17<sup>th</sup> October, the United Nations announced that the elections were fair, conducted without fraud, and were fair. However Jonas Savimbi questioned these results and rejected them.<sup>(11)</sup> This led to the outbreak of civil war in 31<sup>th</sup> October 1992, and fierce battles took place in Luanda and other regions of the country, in which 1,200 people

(1) Margaret Joan Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process 1992-1993, Macmillan Press LTD, London, 1996, pp.7-10.

(2) Khalaf Obaid Hamood, op.cit, pp.2603-2604.

(3) Dorina A. Bekoe, Implementating of peace agreements: lessons from Mozambique, Angola and Liberia, Fifth Avenue, New York, 2008, pp.61-62.

(4) William Minter, Apartheid's contras an inquiry in to the roots of war in Angola and Mozambique, Zed books, London. 1994, pp.53-54; Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, pp.10-11.

(5) Christopher Pycroft, Angola The Forgotten Tragedy, Journal of Southern

African Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, Published by Taylor & Francis, Ltd, (Jun, 1994), p.249.

(6) Khalaf Obaid Hamood, op.cit, p.2604.

(7) Dorina A. Bekoe, op.cit, pp.64-65.

(8) Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, p.134.

(9) Esref Aksu, The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003, p.163.

(10) Human Rights Watch, Angola unravels the rise and fall of the Lusaka peace process, New York, U.S.A, 1999, p.16.

(11) Guus Meijer, from military peace to social justice: The Angolan peace process, Conciliation Resources, London, 2004, p.20.

were killed on both sides, and the civil war continued until the end of the year throughout the northern and southern countries<sup>(1)</sup>.

### **The first chapter: the Angolan civil war 1993.**

By the year 1993, UNITA forces managed to control 75% of Angola's territory, including the port of Lobito and the province of Benguela on the coast south of Luanda, and the centers of a number of important provinces, including Namibia, Malanje, Uíge, Moxico, Ndalatando, and Kuito, and UNITA's plan was to control the centers of those provinces. It was confronting the government air force, so these centers served as a shield for UNITA, because of the inability of the government to bomb residential neighborhoods, and this enabled UNITA to be in a better position.<sup>(2)</sup> But UNITA faced a coordinated government attack at the beginning of the same year, and the government forces were able to control large areas that were under the control of UNITA. At the beginning of January 1993, the MPLA government forces took control of Lubango and entered UNITA headquarters there after fighting that lasted a whole day.<sup>(3)</sup> In 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1993, government forces launched an attack on Huambo, the headquarters of UNITA, which led to the widening of the geographical area of the civil war, as the battles were fought in 10 out of 18 Angolan provinces<sup>(4)</sup>.

In addition in 9<sup>th</sup> January, government forces managed to enter Huambo and expel UNITA forces from it, but UNITA forces were able to withstand the other fighting fronts, and regained control and initiate the attack, and a guerrilla war was launched in several areas near the capital Luanda and the electrical stations were destroyed, which led cut of Water and electricity in Luanda. It also launched an attack on the northwestern regions, killing nearly a thousand supporters of the Angolan government <sup>(5)</sup> In 20<sup>th</sup> January 1993, UNITA forces managed to occupy Soyo

county in the northwest, capturing 17 foreign oil workers, and this brought the MPLA government to a blow that disrupted its economic conditions because Soyo is one of the largest oil producing centers, and UNITA's control over it halted the production of two oil companies which led to a decrease in Angolan oil production to 15%, and the Angolan government's loss was estimated at about \$ 1.5 million per day.<sup>(6)</sup> After Angola was exporting 550,000 barrels per day, exports fell to 474,000 barrels per day, and this continued as long as Soyo was under UNITA control<sup>(7)</sup>.

And what enabled the UNITA forces to control Soyo, by the participation of the Zairian forces to fight alongside the UNITA forces.<sup>(8)</sup> White South African mercenaries and their aircraft also played a major role in the fighting alongside UNITA, and in 24<sup>th</sup> January 1993, the Angolan President delivered a speech in which he referred to the intervention of foreign forces in the battles alongside UNITA<sup>(9)</sup>.

With the continuation of the conflict, the United Nations sought to find a solution to the Angolan conflict, and in 26<sup>th</sup> January 1993, negotiations took place between the two sides in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, attended by a delegation from the United Nations headed by Margaret Anstee, and the Angolan government delegation consisted of 15 people, headed by the Angolan foreign minister Fernando Faustino Muteka. In addition to three ministers and four high-ranking officers, the UNITA delegation was on president eugenio Manuvakola the Secretary General of UNITA is one of its most senior officers, and Samakuva UNITA's representative in London, along with a number of senior officers, and after a lengthy dialogue between the two sides have been agreed<sup>(10)</sup> on the 28<sup>th</sup> of the same month, to preserve the terms of the Bicesse agreement, accept the election results, and that the second round of the presidential elections should take place as soon as possible, and the two sides also agreed to work on a cease-fire.<sup>(11)</sup>

(1) Khalaf Obaid Hamood, op.cit, pp.2615-2616.

(2) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.254.

(3) Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, pp.352-353.

(4) Stephen L. Weigert, *Angola a modern military history 1961-2002*, Martin's Press, New York, 2011, p.113.

(5) Stephen L. Weigert, op.cit, p.113.

(6) Anthony Clayton, *Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa since 1950*, UCL Press Limited, London, 1999, p.149; Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.254.

(7) Stephen L. Weigert, op.cit, p.113.

(8) Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, *Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections*, Human Rights Watch, New York, 1994, p.55.

(9) Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, p.382.

(10) Ibid, pp.380-383.



fire.<sup>(1)</sup> The two sides have placed demands on the other side. The MPLA government demanded UNITA to withdraw from all areas and return its forces to the sites where they were stationed before the outbreak of the civil war in 1992. As for UNITA the called on the MPLA government to give up all the weapons it had acquired since May 1991, considering that in contravention of the "triple zero" clause, which prevented any country from supplying weapons to Angola, and UNITA demanded that these weapons be delivered to the competent authorities, it also asked the MPLA government to disarm the soldiers and militias that had been formed since October 1992, including the riot police, and the MPLA government rejected these demands, and affirmed that it is its duty to maintain security and stability in the country. Preserving law and order and national defense, and it has the right to recruit what it deems appropriate from the military forces, and to purchase sufficient weapons to carry out its duties, and the reason for that controversy is the failure to reach a ceasefire agreement. It was agreed to release the prisoners of both sides, and to hold a round of negotiations on the tenth of February, but the UNITA delegation did not come to Addis Ababa and argued that it was not possible to attend because it was besieged near Huambo, which was witnessing the fiercest battles in Angola's history. During the month of February, the United Nations and the international community called on UNITA to come to the negotiations in Addis Ababa, but it did not respond <sup>(2)</sup> in 28<sup>th</sup> February the Addis Ababa negotiations collapsed due to the absence of the UNITA delegation from attending, and in 1<sup>th</sup> March 1993, the observer states issued a statement denouncing the position of UNITA and her promise is responsible for the failure of the negotiations. He also met with representatives of a number of African countries in the Organization of African Unity with Margaret Anstee and criticized the actions of Savimbi and UNITA's leadership<sup>(3)</sup>.

Besides negotiations, UNITA forces launched on the 30<sup>th</sup> of January of the same year a violent attack to regain control of Huambo, and stressed the shelling by day and

night.<sup>(4)</sup> UNITA was able to impose a complete siege on it, and its use of heavy weapons enabled it to close the Huambo airport and cut off supplies that were transported by air to the Angolan forces. The government tried to transport supplies by land, but UNITA managed to prevent them, and in the face of that the MPLA government forces were forced to withdraw from Huambo to coastal areas on the Atlantic Ocean. Including Namibian, in 8<sup>th</sup> March of the same year, UNITA forces entered Huambo and attacked the retreating MPLA forces, and the civilian and military casualties were estimated between 10,000 and 15,000 dead, and the material losses were estimated at 100,000 pounds, and the Huambo battles continued for 55 continuous days <sup>(5)</sup>.

The United Nations described the Huambo battles as the fiercest fighting in Angola since seventeen years of the civil war, and in 9<sup>th</sup> March, Jonas Savimbi have a long speech in which he affirmed "The Huambo people paid a heavy price in their blood for 55 days and nights in violent clashes never seen before in African military theaters. The battles of Mavinga in 1988 were ten times less violent than what happened in Huambo. We won" he added however "the victory in Huambo does not mean separation, but rather it will be a center of unity for all the Angolan people, unlike Luanda, which inherited values alien to Africa"<sup>(6)</sup>.

Huambo was despite its distance from Luanda, which is located 330 miles southeast of it, but it is of strategic importance to UNITA because it is the center of political support for UNITA, and is the main base for it because its population is from the Avimpondo tribe that supports it. After the end of the battle of Huambo restore UNITA organize its forces in March 1993 and began to launch new attacks on other cities, and managed to impose a blockade on the capitals of several cities including Ndalatando, Malanje, Saurimo, Luena, Kuito and Lubango, as well as their control over large areas in southern Angola<sup>(7)</sup> the MPLA government tried to regain some

(1) Guus Meijer, op. cit, p.30; Stephen L. Weigert, op.cit, p.113.

(2) Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, pp.384-400; Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, pp.254-255.

(3) Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, pp.413-414.

(4) Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, op.cit, p. 21.

(5) George Wright, The Destruction of a Nation United States Policy Towards Angola since 1945, Pluto Press, London, 1997, p.173 ; Stephen L. Weigert, Op.cit, p.114.

(6) Quoted in: Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, pp.418- 421.

(7) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.255.

important areas, and in 13<sup>th</sup> March 1993, it launched a sea attack from Cabinda to retrieve Soyo, but it failed against UNITA, and after its failure, UNITA forces preferred withdrawing from it to prevent fierce fighting and offering greater losses in it, and at the same time it abandoned the attack it had planned on Kuito, besides the two parties to the conflict rushed to conduct negotiations under the influence of the United Nations<sup>(1)</sup> after Savimbi seized control of Huambo and his forces made progress in other regions, he declared that he was ready to negotiate according to certain conditions, including transferring negotiations from Addis Ababa to Geneva, and working to form a government of national unity in Angola for two years<sup>(2)</sup>.

As a result, a peace initiative was launched at the end of March 1993, organized by the President of Ivory Coast Felix Houphouet Boany. At the request of the Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali, initial contacts took place between UNITA, the representative of the United Nations in Angola, Margaret Anstee, and an American delegation during the period 25-29<sup>th</sup> March that ended with an agreement to start negotiations in 12<sup>th</sup> April <sup>(3)</sup> and after a delegation from UNITA met in 9<sup>th</sup> April of the same year with US Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Davido. The negotiations between the delegations of UNITA and the government of MPLA began on 12<sup>th</sup> April in Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast, under the supervision of the United Nations, with the presence of delegations from the observer countries, the United States of America, Russia and Portugal, in addition to the presence of President Houphouet Boany, he proposed the Abidjan Protocol, which was based on the American proposals that included a ceasefire, implementation of the provisions of the Bicesse, work to achieve national reconciliation, allow UNITA members to participate in the government at all levels, and release prisoners and detainees to both parties, and create the appropriate conditions for the provision of essential emergency assistance to all Angolan, and allow the United Nations to carry out its duties in Angola and to expand its role in the negotiations. The United Nations pressured to implement these proposals in 30<sup>th</sup> April 1993, but this did not happen due to disagreement between the delegations of

UNITA and the MPLA government<sup>(4)</sup> In several points, including the Angolan government's demand for UNITA to agree to an immediate ceasefire, but UNITA insisted on temporarily suspending military operations, and that meant a temporary truce. As for the UNITA delegation, it demanded that UNITA forces not be demobilized except after the deployment of 1,200 UN peacekeepers between its forces and the Angolan government forces, But the MPLA government opposed that because it did not want to legitimize UNITA's military gains . As the Angolan government wanted to sign an agreement on the basis of UNITA's approval of the terms of the Bicesse agreement and the results of the elections in 15<sup>th</sup> April, Jonas Savimbi announced in a statement the Confirme of those demands, which led to the suspension of negotiations, the UNITA delegation left Abidjan to consult its leadership.under pressure from the international community, the UNITA delegation returned a week later and reaffirmed the same demands made by Jonas Savimbi <sup>(5)</sup>.

The negotiations continued in Abidjan under the auspices of the United Nations, in which he stressed the importance of implementing the provisions of the Bicesse agreement and establishing peace, and a compromise solution was reached on the paragraphs to be applied by the two parties. UNITA agreed on 38 of the 39 paragraphs, and the eleventh paragraph was disputed, in which the government of MPLA demanded the gradual withdrawal of UNITA forces from the areas it had controlled since the outbreak of the civil war in 1992, UNITA has refused to so it sought through negotiations to find a balance with the MPLA government, especially since the United Nations dealt with UNITA on an equal footing with the MPLA government. This encouraged UNITA to demand the withdrawal of the MPLA government forces from all regions, and put the MPLA forces under the supervision of the United Nations. The MPLA government refused. After its sovereign government, and UNITA's insistence on the mutual withdrawal of the forces of the two sides led to the lack of response from the MPLA government, and in

(1) Stephen L. Weigert, Op.cit, pp.114-115.

(2) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.255.

(3) Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, pp.428-429 .

(4) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, pp.255-256; Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, pp.454-456 .

(5) George Wright, op.cit, pp.175-176.

21<sup>th</sup> May 1993 the Abidjan negotiations ended in failure without reaching an agreement.<sup>(1)</sup>

And as a result of the failure of the Abidjan negotiations, the Angolan government launched attacks during the month of May on UNITA in different locations of the country. The government military command prepared 3,000 Angolan fighters, and that force was supported by forces of Katanga fighters opposed to the Zaire regime. It launched an attack on the Ambriz region in northwest Angola on the Atlantic coast, but its attack stumbled in front of UNITA forces. It also launched an attack on Malanje to open the way to it, and launched an attack on the diamond areas in the northeast of the country with special airborne forces that were landed in the regions, Cafunfo, Lussamba and Cuango. However UNITA forces stationed in the Cuango River valley managed to intensify the launch of surface to air missiles, which led to cutting off air supplies and government forces were surrounded in those areas, and UNITA forces were able at the end of the same month to regain control of those areas. The special forces of UNITA launched a counter-attack in May of the same year on Bengo, Kwanza Norte and Malanje and managed to control Bengo and Kwanza Norte, and failed to control Malanje due to the resilience of the government forces in it.<sup>(2)</sup>

With the recognition of the US administration of the MPLA government. UNITA rushed to strike America's interests, and implement its plan to strike the Angolan economy to confuse the Angolan government. UNITA special forces launched an attack on Soyo and was able to control it in 25<sup>th</sup> May 1993 after a fierce battle that continued Four days forced the MPLA forces to withdraw from air and sea to Cabinda because of the violent attack.<sup>(3)</sup> UNITA destroyed two oil stores in Soyo, destroying 800,000 barrels of oil, and this caused the emergence of a patch in the Atlantic Ocean 38 km wide. UNITA transported the remaining oil to its bases in Zaire.<sup>(4)</sup> After UNITA imposed its control on Soyo, the oil companies operating in Angola threatened to use ground artillery to bomb the Texaco oil facilities 12 km from the shore, forcing it to stop oil production in Angola<sup>(5)</sup>

three days after taking control of Soyo, UNITA forces killed 225 and wounded 250 civilians when they attacked a train on the Lubango Matala line in Huila province, southern Angola, and launched several attacks on Bengo<sup>(6)</sup>.

UNITA achieved victories on several fronts, in June 1993, UNITA managed to control the entry points of Kuito and Menongue. It managed to besiege tens of thousands of people in cities, and the United Nations was unable to implement the world food program which it was supposed to transport food and medical equipment to the besieged areas. As the United Nations planes were attacked by UNITA missiles and were unable to reach the besieged areas, and this led to the suspension of the world food program for the relief of the population. In July 1993, UNITA forces launched a violent attack in which they used heavy artillery on Kuito, Menongue, Malanje and Luena. The most intense battles were in Kuito, as UNITA continued to bombard it with cannons. the human losses in the month of August were estimated at more than 18,000 dead. By September of the same year, UNITA forces attacked Kuito with armored cars and surrounded the government forces and residents in the city center, and it became the arrival of foodstuffs to the residents of Kuito was subject to the approval of UNITA because it imposed control over all entrances to the area, and people were forced to search for foodstuffs in the garbage in order to survive.<sup>(7)</sup> The loss of life was enormous due to the bombing and starvation. The killing of supporters of the Angolan government and the torture of others, and despite all that, the Angolan government emphasized the negotiations to achieve peace.<sup>(8)</sup> In response to the UNITA attacks, the Angolan government prepared in May 1993 a military force to attack Huambo, the headquarters of UNITA. In the beginning of July it launched an offensive from Benguela against Huambo, it was troop movement of the forces was slow. In 26<sup>th</sup> July, the MPLA forces seized the Ganda area on one of the roads leading to Huambo and continued to advance towards it<sup>(9)</sup>.

Throughout 1993, UNITA forces sought to implement the strategy of controlling coastal and rural areas to cut off cities from them, and imposed control over large areas of the countryside. Its aim was to harass the

(1) Guus Meijer, op. cit, p.30; Stephen L. Weigert, op.cit, p.115; Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, pp.484-493.

(2) Stephen L. Weigert, op.cit, p.115.

(3) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.257.

(4) George Wright, op.cit, p.176.

(5) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.257.

(6) George Wright, op.cit, p.176.

(7) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, pp.257-258.

(8) George Wright, op.cit, p.176.

(9) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.258.

government economically by cutting diamonds and oil from it. In return, the Angolan government was able to maintain a long coastal strip extending from Luanda to the Cunene River on the borders of Namibia. In addition to its control over Malanje, Cuando Cubango, and enclaves in Moxico, and since the beginning of August 1993, the winds of battles began to change in favor of the MPLA government forces and were able to control swaths of Benguela and Bengo<sup>(1)</sup> In the same month, the Angolan government forces carried out an attack on several fronts, with the aim of regaining control over the areas occupied by UNITA and was able to control Huila, the provinces of Cuanza Sul, Lunda Sul, and Benguela. The battles between the two sides continued over Kuito, besieged by UNITA forces, in which thousands of civilian and military casualties were killed. Angolan forces also continued to advance towards Huambo and the bombing intensified on it<sup>(2)</sup> The Angolan air force launched strikes on UNITA forces to support the ground forces, and by September, the Angolan forces managed to attack the Balombo area, which is located 60 miles northwest of Huambo. In 16<sup>th</sup> October, MPLA forces managed to take control of Balombo and continued to advance towards UNITA headquarters in Huambo, but the onset of the rainy season prevented them from entering it due to the heavy rains<sup>(3)</sup>.

The intensification of the fighting between July and September 1993 coincided with the security council's decision to impose sanctions on UNITA, including the oil and arms embargo, if it did not comply with the ceasefire no later than 15<sup>th</sup> September 1993, and UNITA tried to avoid Security Council resolutions international by imposing sanctions on it. It announced in 13<sup>th</sup> September that it would cease fire on the 21<sup>st</sup> of the same month. United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali gave UNITA one last opportunity to resume negotiations, but it did not implement the ceasefire. In 26<sup>th</sup> September the security council imposed sanctions on UNITA in order to force it to negotiate and stop the fighting, including the arms and oil embargo on it, but these sanctions were not fully implemented. UNITA continued to obtain

weapons through Zaire<sup>(4)</sup>. The military capacity of UNITA was strong. It had 60,000 soldiers and it had various weapons, including 107mm rockets and thermal missiles. Its military units were distinguished by their high discipline, and it imposed its control over some areas. UNITA continued fighting fiercely.<sup>(5)</sup> UNITA implemented the plan to besiege cities and prevent food supplies from reaching them, especially Kuito, Menongue and Malanje. It planted land mines in large areas around the cities to prevent their residents from working in agricultural fields in order to endanger agricultural production, but this harmed the population and exposed them to starvation<sup>(6)</sup>.

With the continuation of the fighting, the United Nations and a number of countries pressured Jonas Savimbi to give up the military option and negotiate with the Angolan government to end the conflict. This forced Savimbi to announce in statement in October 1993 accepting the provisions of the Bicesse agreement, that opened the way to holding talks in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia. In November of the same year for negotiations between the two parties of the conflict<sup>(7)</sup> initial negotiations took place between Alioune Blondin Beye, the UN representative in Angola, and a delegation from UNITA in New York, and gave UNITA a written undertaking to abide by the UN Security Council resolution of 15<sup>th</sup> September 1993, in which it demanded that UNITA withdraw from all territories it had controlled since September 1992 and return to the observation areas designated for demobilization, respect for the election result, then negotiations began in 15<sup>th</sup> November 1993 between the delegations of UNITA and the Angolan government in Lusaka. On November 18<sup>th</sup> the negotiations reached a dead end due to UNITA's demands for the release of thousands of military prisoners in the prisons of the Angolan government, UNITA also insisted on the deployment of UN peacekeepers in the areas that were under the control of UNITA forces while the MPLA government delegation demanded the disarmament of UNITA and the weapons of its civilian supporters, and the acceptance of UNITA in the government of MPLA elected, and abide by the terms Bicesse agreement. The two parties reached an understanding in 10<sup>th</sup> December 1993 regarding the demobilization

(1) Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, op.cit, p.21-22.

(2) George Wright, op.cit, p.180.

(3) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.258.

(4) Guus Meijer, op. cit, pp.20-21; Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, pp.258-259.

(5) Anthony Clayton, op.cit, p.149.

(6) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.259.

(7) Guus Meijer, op. cit, p.21.



of UNITA forces and their integration with the Angolan armed forces, but no final settlement was reached due to UNITA's claim to ministerial positions in the cabinet of a new national unity government. In 13<sup>th</sup> December, UNITA announced its withdrawal from the negotiations. It claimed that Jonas Savimbi had been subjected to an assassination attempt in Kuito, and as a result, the Third United Nations Mission in Angola conducted an investigation into the incident in 21<sup>st</sup> December, and did not prove with conclusive evidence that an assassination attempt had been premeditated, and that forced Savimbi to accept a return to negotiations that he decided to resume in 5<sup>th</sup> January 1994. At the end of 1993 UNITA forces launched a mortar attack on US Gulf Oil Company facilities in Cabinda, and attacked government military bases in Menongue and Malanje<sup>(1)</sup> by the end of 1993. UNITA forces were able to control large areas of Angola's territory, which were estimated at about 70%. This put the government forces in a critical situation despite their continued fighting ferociously<sup>(2)</sup> in return this increased the power of UNITA because it controlled large areas containing diamonds which it exploited in the arms purchase trade. Both sides abandoned the triple zero clause agreement under the Bicesse agreement, which banned the export of arms to Angola, and tow sides parties obtained weapons from foreign countries<sup>(3)</sup>.

One of the effects of the Angolan civil war was that the country was exposed to exorbitant human losses. According to the estimates of the United Nations Mission to investigate Angola, the human losses in 1993 were about 300,000 of the militaries and civilians<sup>(4)</sup> and the laws of war were violated by both sides of the conflict, as urban cities were subjected to indiscriminate bombing, as well as hunger, lack of health and education services, and landmines spread over large areas and caused hundreds of civilian lives to be killed<sup>(5)</sup>.

### **The second chapter: The American position of the Angolan civil war 1993**

(1) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, pp.259-260.

(2) Human Rights Watch, op.cit, p.18.

(3) Martin Rupiya, *Evolutions & Revolutions A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa*, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, 2005, pp.31-32.

(4) Esref Aksu, op.cit, p.155.

(5) Human Rights Watch, op.cit, p.16.

In 1992 the US administration supported UNITA and devoted its efforts to involve UNITA in a government of national unity, and it was not blamed for the events that took place in Angola. It provided secret aid to UNITA estimated at about 6 million dollars through the C.I.A, and from the funds of the 1992 fiscal year were transferred through non governmental organizations via Namibia. The Bush administration claimed that the aid was for food, providing services in areas controlled by UNITA, and helping it to move into civilian life, and it also continued not recognizing the Angolan government<sup>(6)</sup>.

After Bill Clinton won the elections, the US administration continued not to recognize the elected government of MPLA, and the day before Bill Clinton assumed his presidency in 20<sup>th</sup> January 1993, UNITA seized the coastal oil facilities in Soyo Prefecture, this angered the oil companies operating in Soyo, including the American Chevron Oil company. It declared its fear of UNITA attacking the oil installations in Cabinda, and in response, the American liaison officer in Angola, Edmund Dejarnette announced in 23<sup>th</sup> January, instructions were issued from Washington not to attack Cabinda by Dr. Savimbi's forces. At the same day, the US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announced that UNITA should stop any other offensive action in Soyo, and stop any plan to attack Cabinda immediately<sup>(7)</sup>.

In spite of that, the United States of America facilitated UNITA communication and broadcasting operations via its satellites during the year 1993, and UNITA made international calls and broadcasted the radio to Angola and other countries free of charge without any costs, and continued not to recognize in the MPLA government<sup>(8)</sup> When the Addis Ababa negotiations were continuing, the representative of the United States of America at the United Nations Welker declared in mid-February of the same year that the American administration had no intention of recognizing the government of Angola, and the statement had its repercussion at the global level. Many believed that the American administration was waiting for recognition of the side that would settle the conflict in its favor, and this weakened the position of the

(6) Khalaf Obaid Hamood, op.cit, pp. 2617-2618.

(7) S. Holmes, *U.S. Accuses Angolan Rebels of Inciting Civil War*, New York Times, (23 January 1993).

(8) George Wright, op.cit, p.172.

United Nations, which was working to find a solution to the Angolan conflict<sup>(1)</sup>.

With the continuation of the Angolan civil war during 1993, the United States of America provided support to UNITA, but UNITA threatened US interests and continued to reject the results of the elections, in addition to the continuous failure of negotiations because of them, this led to the inclination of the American administration to the Angolan government, especially since American oil companies were operating in Angola<sup>(2)</sup>.

The United States of America continued to pursue its dual policy. In Addis Ababa negotiations that took place in January and February 1993, the American administration, along with Portugal and Russia, as observers of the Bicesse agreement, tried to stick to the continuation of the negotiations to contain Jonas Savimbi, in 23<sup>rd</sup> February, at the same year, the observer States held a meeting in Lisbon and called for the formation of a national unity government in response to the desire of the United States of America, and tried to involve UNITA in the Angolan government, regardless its excesses, when the Addis Ababa negotiations collapsed in 28<sup>th</sup> February 1993 because UNITA did not attend the negotiations, the Clinton administration continued not to recognize the MPLA government, despite the escalation of liberal demands in Congress and a number of American organizations to do so. In addition to demanding influential figures through the press, but the Clinton administration tried to increase pressure on UNITA by diplomatic means to convince it to negotiate. In March the US administration, in cooperation with the United Nations, pressured on UNITA to force it to negotiate, this was with the escalation of American demands for recognition of the MPLA government. In 25<sup>th</sup> March a number of members of the US Congress demanded the Clinton administration formal recognition of the MPLA government as a means of pressure on UNITA to bring about peace. US Secretary of State Warren Minor Christopher announced a warning to Savimbi in the event that he is not ready for negotiations. The US administration would recognize the government of Angola, and called for Savimbi to meet with the representative of the United States of America in Abidjan, capital of Ivory Coast to reach an agreement on negotiations<sup>(3)</sup>.

Despite this the United States of America continued to try to defend UNITA against the

international community. When the Security Council discussed its Resolution No. 811 to issue deterrent sanctions to UNITA, the UN Security Council faced difficulty in taking such sanctions due to the US administration's position, which the United Nations described as ambiguous. It preferred to take less severe decisions than other countries demanded, especially Brazil, Spain, and Russia. US Assistant Secretary of State Geoffrey Davido told the United Nations representative in Angola, Margaret Anstee, that the reason for the US administration's pursuit of this approach is its desire to avoid distancing UNITA from the United States of America more than necessary in order to influence it<sup>(4)</sup>.

Following that a delegation of UNITA met in 28<sup>th</sup> March 1993 Assistant Secretary of State US Jeffrey Davidow in Abidjan, and Davido tried to persuade the UNITA delegation to negotiate, and suggested to the UNITA delegation to demand to participate in the sharing of power with the government of MPLA To obtain ministerial positions, and positions in provinces, municipal administrations. He called Jeffrey Savimbi to stop attacking US oil facilities in Angola, also met with Jeffrey a number of officials from the government of MPLA in Abidjan and urged them to enter into negotiations with UNITA. After the days of George Moss repeated what Jeffrey had affirmed to the Angolan government which confirmed its readiness to enter into negotiations with UNITA if it abided by the terms of the Bicesse agreement and the result of the September 1992 elections. With a commitment to the decisions taken by the United Nations on Angola, Jonas Savimbi agreed to enter the negotiations because of the military gains that his forces had achieved. In addition to his certainty of the Clinton administration's support for him with regard to power sharing, but the negotiations failed as mentioned<sup>(5)</sup>.

After the American administration realized the failure of the Abidjan negotiations, its early recognition of the MPLA government came before the negotiations were suspended. In 19<sup>th</sup> May 1993, it formally recognized the new government of Dos Santos, and praised its position in the negotiations and its continuous endeavor to reach a settlement. At the same time condemned the position of UNITA for its rejection of the election result and its continuing war. The truth about the change in the US position was the Clinton

(1) Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, p.399.

(2) Guus Meijer, op. cit, p.20.

(3) George Wright, op.cit, pp.172 -174.

(4) Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, pp.424-428.

(5) George Wright, op.cit, pp.174 -175.

administration's realization that UNITA can not achieve a decisive victory by seizing Luanda, also, the attacks of UNITA on Soyo Prefecture, which represents the center of the American oil companies aroused its anger, and the real reason that angered it was the hidden pressure from the US oil companies, and direct pressure from the black members of the US Congress who stood against UNITA because of its intransigence in the negotiations. All of these prompted the Bill Clinton administration to recognize the MPLA government. This was in the interest of the Angolan government. Several states have changed their policy direction, and UNITA is isolated<sup>(1)</sup>.

Immediately after recognition, President Clinton affirmed that the decision to recognize the government of Angola reflects the priority that our administration attaches to democracy, and that the decision came because of Jonas Savimbi's refusal to sign peace agreements. The Angolan government, on the contrary agreed to sign the peace agreement and took the constitutional oath in a democratically elected national assembly. Clinton expressed his hope that UNITA would accept a negotiated settlement and be part of the government<sup>(2)</sup>.

After UNITA threatened the US oil interests in Soyo in 25<sup>th</sup> May 1993, the US position began to change constantly towards UNITA.<sup>(3)</sup> In 12<sup>th</sup> June of the same year, the United States of America issued a joint statement with Portugal and Russia expressing its disappointment over UNITA's intention to continue the civil war and intensify its efforts to seize large areas of Angolan territory. And the destruction of economic structures and infrastructure, at the expense of the well-being of the people of Angola. The statement stressed that UNITA's actions contradict its declaration to work for a peaceful solution. The statement stressed the commitment of the international community to a peaceful political solution to solve the post-election crisis<sup>(4)</sup>.

Subsequently George Moose, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs visited Luanda during the period from June 21<sup>st</sup> to 23<sup>rd</sup> for the purpose of opening official

diplomatic relations between the United States of America and Angola. During the visit, he met with the Angolan President Dos Santos, and Moss also tried to meet with Savimbi, but this did not happen because of Savimbi's insistence on meeting in Huambo instead of Luanda, in 21<sup>st</sup> June 1993, the US liaison office in Luanda was upgraded to an embassy and Edmund DeJarnette was appointed the first ambassador of the United States of America in Luanda, and full diplomatic representation was exchanged with Angola. This took place in the midst of a celebration in Luanda, and it was agreed to sign agreements between the two parties at the level of the Ministry of foreign affairs<sup>(5)</sup>. George Moss stated in Luanda that the upgrade of the liaison office to an embassy is an important step in strengthening America's relationship with the Angolan government, and that America will commit to working with the Angolan government on the basis of mutual respect, affirming the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic development. We will work side by side with the United Nations, Russia and Portugal for a democratic government in Angola and the promotion of peace and national reconciliation. Then Moss met with Angolan defense minister Pedro Maria Tonha and chief of staff of the Angolan armed forces, Joao de Matos, and assured them that the US administration would end the triple zero<sup>(6)</sup>.

George Moose also met Margaret Anstee and urged her to work for new negotiations for a ceasefire in Angola, and understanding with Madeleine Albright, US Ambassador to the United Nations, which was convinced of the idea and working to put forward at the United Nations. He assured her that President Dos Santos supported the idea and suggested putting it up at the summit of the Organization of African Unity to be held in Cairo at the end of June 1993, and advised promoting the idea among African heads of state as a starting point for achieving peace. It is then presented to the Troika countries in Angola at its meeting scheduled on July 8<sup>th</sup> in the same year, and then presented to the Security Council, the international at its meeting scheduled on 15<sup>th</sup> of the same month, Moose indicated that the US administration wants to give Jonas Savimbi another opportunity to persuade him to return to negotiations, and America has continued to pressure Jonas Savimbi to persuade him to negotiate on the one hand, and to strengthen its relations with the Angolan government on the

(1) Eric Morier Genoud, *Sure road? Nationalisms in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2012, p.206; Martin Rupiya, *op.cit*, p.30.

(2) George Wright, *op.cit*, p.176.

(3) Christopher Pycroft, *op.cit*, p.257.

(4) T. Lippman, *African Crises Test Limited U.S. Commitment*, Washington Post, (13 June 1993).

(5) Margaret Joan Anstee, *op.cit*, p.510.

(6) George Wright, *op.cit*, p.178.

other hand<sup>(1)</sup> Upon the return of George Moss to Washington, he criticized UNITA explicitly for their unwillingness to cooperate for peace, and at the end of June 1993, he announced the United States to lift the ban imposed on the government of Angola, That prevented it from importing lethal and non-lethal weapons such as uniforms, communications equipment, transport vehicles, and aircraft from US manufacturers<sup>(2)</sup>.

The administration of Bill Clinton provided support to the government of Angola and worked to lift the ban imposed on it to buy arms, in July 8<sup>th</sup> 1993, representatives of the Troika countries. The United States of America, Russia and Portugal met in Moscow in their capacity as observers of the Bicesse agreement, and the abandonment of the triple zero clause was discussed in order to allow the Angolan government to buy weapons, under the pretext of supporting the democratic system in Angola. This was a new turning point in the policy of the United States of America and its allies towards the MPLA government after its starding against for 18 years.<sup>(3)</sup> The American ambassador to Angola, Edmund Degarnett, indicated to the change the US position clearly in a statement on July 15<sup>th</sup>, he emphasized that the Angolan government has gained its legitimacy through free and fair elections and has the right to exercise in self-defense, and it has the right to search for any mechanism it deems necessary to defend itself against any enemy that resorts to the use of weapons against it.<sup>(4)</sup> This was a clear signal from the United States of America in redefining its policy towards Angola which led to a change in the international community's attitude towards the Angolan conflict, and as a result, Britain announced in 9<sup>th</sup> August 1993 a decision to officially lift the arms embargo on Angola, and confirmed that Russia was negotiating with Luanda to export weapons to it.<sup>(5)</sup> Subsequently the government at able to Angolan was get large quantities of arms from Russia of Portugal, Brazil, Britain, France, and Israel, including aircraft and transport vehicles, uniforms and other weapons.<sup>(6)</sup>

And to tighten sanctions against UNITA, Russia proposed in September 1993 far-reaching and effective measures, including

freezing UNITA's global bank accounts, in order to weaken them, but the United States of America opposed that, raising suspicions that UNITA was still receiving support from officials in the Bill Clinton administration, and the United States of America tried to restore the negotiations by finding an African mediator, and in the same month it chose the President of Sao Tome-Principe Miguel Trovoad, who pursued the quest for a solution to the Angolan problem.<sup>(7)</sup> As a result, Miguel Trovoad appealed to the Angolan government and UNITA in September of the same year to come to Sao Tome for talking in order to open the door to negotiations for peace, but the initiative failed because of Jonas Savimbi refused to negotiate with the government of Angola. America tried to force UNITA to negotiations with the Angolan government to reach a peaceful settlement and consistently confirmed the support of the government of MPLA in order to make UNITA feel weak<sup>(8)</sup>.

When the Security Council issued international sanctions against UNITA on September 15<sup>th</sup> 1993 on the impact that Brazil has proposed the imposition of additional sanctions against UNITA, including the freezing of international bank accounts of UNITA, and the travel ban on UNITA to all regions of the world, America opposed that, and demanded that these sanctions be postponed until the 26<sup>th</sup> of the same month to give UNITA additional time to accept negotiations. Boutros Ghali has agreed on the US proposals, but the UN Security Council announced that it would impose additional sanctions on UNITA in November 1<sup>th</sup>, including closing UNITA diplomatic offices in foreign capitals and the expulsion of their representatives from them, and not to grant visas to members of UNITA, and the confiscation of UNITA funds in foreign banks in the event of failure to reach a permanent agreement for a cease-fire. In 16<sup>th</sup> September Robert Gray confirmed in the United Nations, on behalf of the Ambassador of the United States of America in the United Nations, Madeleine Albright that the international community holds UNITA responsible for the continuation of the war in Angola and will not tolerate it in this regard, and the UNITA leadership must understand that the US administration is ready to impose sanctions on UNITA if it does not implement the

(1) Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, pp.510-512.

(2) George Wright, op.cit, p.178.

(3) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.257.

(4) George Wright, op.cit, p.179.

(5) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.257.

(6) George Wright, op.cit, pp.178-180.

(7) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.259.

(8) George Wright, op.cit, pp.179-180.



resolutions of the United Nations. Considering that last warning to UNITA<sup>(1)</sup>.

This was followed by the Clinton administration's attempt to persuade UNITA to negotiate. A day after the issuance of the UN Security Council's decision to impose sanctions on UNITA, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Edward Bryn met with a delegation from UNITA in Abidjan he asked the UNITA delegation what the US administration could do in order to support peace in Angola and support the UN initiatives in this regard, and Edward Bryn from the UNITA delegation realized that Savimbi could not accept negotiations with the Angolan government. And cooperation with the international community. As a result, the US State Department announced that the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on UNITA due to its non-compliance would come into effect at midnight in 25<sup>th</sup> September 1993, and that the US administration is disappointed because UNITA did not respond to a ceasefire and negotiations. The day after the entry into force of the sanctions, the US administration issued a memorandum in which it prohibited UNITA weapons and related materials, as well as oil and petroleum products in all their forms, and prohibited any activities promoting the sale of these products. The Clinton administration announced that those measures that had been taken were nothing but an expression of the American administration's anger over the continuing hostilities of UNITA and its lack of commitment to the results of the democratic transition in Angola in the post-election period<sup>(2)</sup>.

The Clinton administration has pursued toward Angola, to encouraging the United Nations to mediate in support of the peace process in Angola, with the escalation of its calls for a ceasefire and negotiations to reach a peaceful settlement. The American administration also planned to provide sufficient technical and economic assistance to the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the event of a peaceful settlement, and in 22<sup>nd</sup> of October 1993, the Clinton administration appointed Paul Hare, its former ambassador to Zambia, as its representative with the members of the observer countries, Russia and Portugal, and Paul Hare's role was to provide assistance in the negotiations as a member of the observer states. When the Lusaka negotiations began

in 15<sup>th</sup> November 1993 between Alioune Blondin Beye representative of the United Nations in Angola and the government of Angola and UNITA under the supervision of observer States and the United Nations, under the influence of the United States of America. The UN Security Council decided to postpone the vote on any resolution to impose additional sanctions on UNITA with the aim of making the negotiations a success, which lasted for more than a month, during which President Clinton met with Angolan Ambassador in Washington, Jose Patricio he assured him of the US administration's keenness for the success of the Lusaka negotiations<sup>(3)</sup> and because of UNITA continuing its war against the MPLA government, the United States of America canceled the concession of UNITA to use the voice of America radio transmitter in Botswana, and this led to damage to the UNITA foreign broadcasting station at the end of 1993<sup>(4)</sup>.

## CONCLUSION

Through studying the research I reached several conclusions namely:

- 1- The divisions within Angolan society have led to a long struggle for power, and that the UNITA organization led by Jonas Savimbi was not its true inclination to build a democratic system in the country, but rather its desire to impose its control by force on the country and dominate it to exploit its resources for the benefit of its supporters, and that paved the way for the government of MPLA to continue governing the country in a system that lacks democracy.
- 2- Both the MPLA government and UNITA took advantage of the conditions of the negotiations in order to strengthen their forces, and the battle conditions were controlling the negotiations. This means that the two parties of the conflict were not convinced to reach a peaceful solution and tried to settle the situation on the battlefield. But neither side was able to achieve a decisive victory over the other side, and of course that position spoiled the creation of real peace in the country.

(1) J. Preston, UN Punishes Angola Rebels with Sanctions, Washington Post, (16 September 1993).

(2) George Wright, op.cit, pp.183-184.

(3) George Wright, op.cit, pp.185-186.

(4) Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.257.

- 3- When the Bill Clinton administration reached the US presidency on 20<sup>th</sup> January 1993, a change occurred in the American policy towards Angola to preserve its interests, but it affected UNITA. If the previous George Bush administration had taken such measures, it would have been possible to prevent the outbreak of the Angolan civil war again, and that the Clinton administration abandoned UNITA was not a loss for it, but rather for the sake of preserving its interests in Angola. The loser was UNITA and the Angolan people who suffered from poverty and useless death.
- 4- The role of the United Nations was weak in Angola, and it did not have a decisive role. It did not take a military position to prevent the party causing the Angolan civil war, and it was content with imposing limited sanctions, some of which were not implemented on the ground.
- 5- The role of the three troika states, Portugal, United States of America, and Russia was not sufficient to deter the conflict, as was the case for the African regional countries that did not have a clear role in the attempt to bring about the Angolan peace.
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