

October War 1973 And Iraqi Stance

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ABSTRACT

The research entitled (October War 1973 and the Iraqi Stance) is summarized in the causes of the October war or as it is called in Egyptian literature that war which greatly undermined the Egyptian forces and gave the Arab army the great ability to achieve the desired goals . Whether in the Golan plateau or Sinai, and a great insistence on restoring the lands that were occupied by Israel in 1967 . Where this war demonstrated the military ability of the Arab forces, their unification of forces and confrontation to respond to achieve victory . So the research clearly shows the Arab stance, including the stance of Iraq . Which has been strengthened through active participation alongside Egypt and Syria . Despite the Arab region faces of internal and external challenges , but Iraq participated in this war in defying suffering of the Iraqi army to reaching the battlefield and the border distance and resolving it in favor of the Arabs and achieving the supportive victory and raising the morale of all participating forces . Especially this war showed the size of the close relationship between the United States and Israel as an integral part of the general policy of many monopolistic institutions in the Arab region , failure of the Israeli intelligence to find the secrets of battlefield and in concern of support the war for Arab solidarity . Which it was represented by the participation of Iraq, Jordan and Morocco in fighting on the Syrian front . Such as participation of Algeria and Kuwait in fighting on the Egyptian front . So from this standpoint , the war formed a form of liberation movements that contributed to defeat the Israeli army with all its military capabilities and drawing the required end to this fateful battle

Keywords: October War , Iraqi stance, Arab stance, Gulf stance

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Introduction

October War of 1973 , or as it is called in the literature of Egyptian sources , was one of the important wars that greatly undermined the Israeli forces after strategic planning , vision between Egypt and Syria . Where the two armies were able to achieve the desired goals, whether in the Golan plateau or the Sinai to regain the lands that Israel occupied them in year 1967 . Which Israel largely recognized its loss and failure in this war and its military retreat . Where Arab forces made to unify awareness of forces in the front to confront , which proved its great ability to respond and restore all occupied lands according to the theory of Arab solidarity that drew for the battle the individual military capacity by victory and overcoming the Israeli forces . And to exhaust them in particular after using the slogan of oil as a weapon in the battle as a means of pressure to end the battle with an Arab will and with a great military balance between the participating forces, including the Iraqi forces ... So that the position of Iraq comes ... to consolidate this victory by

participating in this pivotal war beside of Egypt and Syria . So its contribution was clear . Which its features stated in this research entitled ((October war 1973 and the Iraqi stance on it through two research , title of research is the Arab conditions before war of 1973 . Which includes two demands , the title of first demand : The general points for the Arab situations . Which it deals with the political situations after death of Egyptian President Jamal Abdunaser and coming of Mohammed Anwar Al – Sadat to power . Where it started a new period of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The second demand is entitled: Preliminaries to the October War , in which it reviews the preparation for this war and all that preceded it , specifically the June setback in 1967 . The whole that the Arabs lost from the territories . Then second research which it is titled : The October War 1973 and its comprehensive results . Which includes two demands : The first demand: The beginnings of the war and deals with the starting point of this war on 6 October and the military movement of the participating forces

which are represented by the Egyptian and Syrian forces . As for the second demand , it is entitled the October war and the Iraqi stance on it . Which reviews how Iraq participated militarily in this war , despite not being notified of hours of beginning this war . In addition to the Iraqi army's suffering with access and participation . Particularly its movements and the border distance between it and Syria. Then after that the conclusion , concluded points and the most important sources are used in this research

The first research : The Arab situations before the 1973 war

The first demand : The general frame for the Arab situations

A) Mohammad Anwar Al - Sadat came to power :

While death the Egyptian President Jamal Abdulnaser and Mohammad Anwar Al - Sadat assumption of presidency of Arab Republic of Egypt . A new period of the Arab-Israeli conflict began , because the post-Naserian period constitutes a radical transformation, albeit not a major thing in the conflict between Egypt and Israel because it means end of a leadership system with a " Bureaucratic model " Pragmatic .

Although the new president announced from the beginning that he would continue on the path of his predecessor and kept the doors open for diplomatic initiatives and gave his approval to extend the ceasefire . Events later indicated that he had followed a different approach than his predecessor . And despite mediation and international efforts to sign a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel on the condition of its withdrawal from the lands that it occupied them in 1967 and "failure" of these initiatives. However, the military operations did not resume despite the end of the ceasefire period that actually lasted until the 6 October 1973 war

Thus this period remained anxious and unstable . Even it was called in Arab literature the period of no war and no peace between 1970-1973 . In fact the situation was closer to war than to

peace, especially with the continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands and continuation of Egyptian work to build the necessary military capabilities for the comprehensive liberation process .

Initiatives of settlement :

In order to get out of this impasse , international initiatives were put forward like the mission of Gunnar Jarring who was the Swedish ambassador in Moscow . Who tried to combine the two "Israeli" and Egyptian stances . Where he had succeeded in extracting Egypt's declaration for the first time of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel , on the condition of its withdrawal , but Israel refused pledge to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders . So Gunnar Jarring's mission failed , in addition to failure of Rogers' proposal to hold close talks with the aim of reaching an agreement about the canal in February 1972 . This included presentation of projects , proposals, ideas, mediation and talks for Palestinian issue, with aim of resolving them , like the project of the Egyptian president Mohammed Anwar Al – Sadat on 28 December 1970 . And project of the African thinkers , which its provisions was formulated at the meeting of the summit of the African unity organization that was held on 22 June 1971 . Likewise , the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan project on 15 / 3 / 1972

But the remarkable change that has occurred is the change of slogan . Which Egypt has been continued to do since 1952 about fulfilling the national rights of the Palestinian people and to make it more clear than ever by calling on the Palestinians to establish (Palestinian State) in the west bank and Gaza strip after evacuation ((The Israelis)) away from them . So that the Palestinians who are represented by the Palestinian liberation organization must be ready to enter into any future negotiations to settle the conflict with Israel

It is the policy that continued for Egypt until the 6 October war 1973 war . When some members of the Palestinian liberation organization itself were calling for an independent national

authority in the west bank and Gaza strip . Which made the Arab-Israeli conflict took another impression after this war broke out on the Egyptian and Syrian sides in order to withdraw Israel from the occupied territories which it occupied them in war of 1967 and the quest to return stolen Palestinian lands

Second demand : Preliminaries of October war :

When the war 1967 caused great losses in Egypt, Jordan and Syria in front of small losses to Israel . This matter which led to a clear imbalance in the military balance between the participating parties in this war which paved the way for the Israeli forces to occupy large areas of Arab land , like the Suez canal, the Sinai desert, the Jordan valley and the Syrian Golan Heights . Which granted Israel itself freedom of military maneuver and to penetrate the Arab airspace without deterrence . Which made it easier to Israel to establish a deep strategic defense that was represented by the Bar Lev Line which extends along the Suez canal and Alon Line on the Syrian Golan front , this greatly enhanced freedom of navigation in the strait of Tiran and the Red Sea .

In the light of all this . Israel proceeded to procrastinate in the outcome of the war 1967 , especially resolution no. 242 that issued on 22 / 11 / 1967 . Which includes the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the lands they occupied and clearly evading from implementation of the aforementioned resolution . Which paved the way for it to establish many settlements and status of expansion in the Palestinian territories like the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As a result , Israel became a state of rebellion, obstinacy and obstruction of many of the projects that mentioned earlier , such as "Gonarianig" project to implement Resolution no. 242 in addition to the Rogers project that was proposed by the United States of America on 19 / 6 / 1970

All these reasons , the persistence of obstinacy on the part of Israel made Egypt and Syria seek to regain the occupied lands and compensate for the losses caused by the June

setback in 1967. Starting of a war of depletion of the Israeli military capabilities in preparation for the start of the October war 1973 , therefore the Egyptian , Syrian leaderships began their consultations and transferred the agreements between them into Serious agreements

On 26 / 11 / 1973 , the two governments signed a military agreement that defined the of the military fighting pillars . Where both the Egyptian President Anwar Al - Sadat and the Syrian President Hafez Assad met on 25 / 2 / 1973 . Where the zero starting point for this war was determined and liberation of the usurped Arab lands

Second Research : October war 1973 and its overall results

First demand : Beginnings of the war :

When determining the parameters of start of this battle and taking all military measures . The zero hour began on 6 October 1973 . When the Israeli warplanes launched an aggression targeted the radar devices and the Syrian artillery site at that time ground clashes were taking place between the two sides . Syria had announced that had been destroyed approximately fifteen Israeli tanks , four planes were shot down and ten enemy artillery batteries were hit along the front . While Syria lost two aircraft and two soldiers were killed

The Egyptians were able to cross and destroy the Bar-Lev line . Which was considered the most important defense line in modern times. The Syrians were also able to advance towards the Golan front . Which led to the exalted voices of the Zionist press in the United States of America . Where the vast majority of which had attacked the Arab advance and described it as (The Arab invasion on Israel)

The outbreak of the 6 October war 1973 . It was regarded as a great surprise ((to Israel)) because the Arabs chose the Day of Yom Kippur . Which is one of the holiest and most sacred days of the Jews . At the time of the attack on Israel . This war found unified Arab response and support . Where the Libyan President Muammar Al - Gaddafi declared his commitment to the battle notwithstanding he did not agree with its plan ,

such as Algeria and Kuwait put its capabilities in the service of the battle . Where all sections of the Arab people, their organizations, their preparations and their newspapers supported this battle , during escalation of the fighting on 16 October 16 1973 . The Egyptian President Mohammed Anwar Al - Sadat addressed an open letter to Nixon the President of US , included it a project for peace contained the points as following :

- 1) Withdrawal of "Israel" from the lands occupied since 1976
- 2) Cessation of fire , to be provided that Israel withdraws directly from all Arab lands occupied in 1976
- 3) Preparing to attend an international peace conference
- 4) Dredging the Suez Canal and to open it before the international shipping
- 5) His unwillingness to accept vague promises

Meanwhile these events . Intense political contacts were taken place between Moscow and Washington to stop the fighting in the region. Where Kissinger who is the US Secretary of State went by air to Moscow . Where he had met with Mr. Leonid Brezhnev who is the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party . The meeting resulted in initiative both states to present joint project of resolution to Security Council to call on the conflicting parties to stop shooting on 22 October 1973 . Where in which the council approved the draft resolution no. 338 which stated as below :

- 1) Calling on all parties involved in the fighting for a ceasefire
- 2) Calling on all parties to start , after the ceasefire and implement Security Council Resolution No. 242 in 1967
- 3) After the ceasefire , negotiations will take place between the concerned parties

The Egyptian government accepted on 22 October 1973 a cease-fire . This agreement was signed between parties Egypt and Israel and on its annexes at (101 Km) under supervision of United Nations representatives

Therefore, the October war produced many of political, military and international consequences . The most notable of them as following :

- 1) The war on the Arab side demonstrated the technological and military capacity of the Arab fighter, the ability of the Arab military leadership to create new concepts in the strategic environment
- 2) The war on the Israeli side seriously placed Israeli national security theory into question . This theory that was presented by the builders of the Zionist state since the fifties decade . It was found in its practical embodiment after the June War of 1967. This war also eradicated the myth of the Israeli army that does not defeated . Such as failure of Israeli intelligence to know secrets of the Arabs , their readiness , ability of the Arabs to plan , implement and use modern advanced weapons with superiority and success . In addition to support the war for Arab solidarity in various military and economic fields . Where Jordan, Iraq and Morocco participated in the fighting on the Syrian front . Algeria and Kuwait participated in the fighting on the Egyptian front . Where the October war proved that the relationship between the United States of America and Israel is an integral part of the general policy of many monopolistic institutions in the Arab region

The October war confirmed the objective vision of the international conditions that surrounded the Middle East conflict , especially as the Arabs have become to believe that the available capacities without strong political will . They are in the final analysis merely rigid numbers that do not move situations

Likewise, this war caused a profound change in the psyche of the Arab people and a collapse in the souls of Israel . Where the Arab people ceased to question themselves after the war saved them from the nightmare of defeat and pushed the Zionist entity to cease its belief that it will remain indefinitely or it is able to impose a solution on Arabs , to draw lines in their absence and against their will

The victories of October 1973 led to increase the awareness of the Arab nation, its government with its responsibilities, its material and human capabilities. Where this awareness was embodied in a practical solidarity that confirmed its effectiveness and gave a new dimension to the Arab liberation movement, particularly since the main aim of it is to destroy the military strength of Israel. Which is based on its basis this entity and implementation of UN security council resolution no. 242.

As for its results at the international level. It led to the emergence of a new power in the world which it is the strength of the Arab nation. The institute for strategic studies in London recorded this phenomenon and stated that year 1973. Which conflict prevailed in the middle east and use of petroleum weapons had witnessed emergence of a sixth power in the world. Which is group of Arab oil-exporting countries. Which was added to the military strength of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Also to the power of China, Japan and the European common market.

Such as October 1973 war had led to occurrence a new leap quantitatively and qualitatively in the armament curve in (Israel). Weapon systems with a high level of technology and the most advanced military production in the world poured into it. Where they founded in the arena of the Arab – Israeli conflict a wide market and a field of experimentation for its great effectiveness. Where this war awakened once again obsession of qualitative superiority among Israeli military planners.

This fourth Arab – Israeli war is regarded as first real war between the Arab armies and Israel since 1948. Because it revealed many facts that require reconsideration of the assessments that emerged before that, which are represented by the dysfunctional psychology that was caused by the setback of 5 June 1967. This war came to be a new experience for Israel, as it contained again in terms of decision-making and initiative in the attack, events and the course of the battle.

Second demand : October war and Iraqi stance :

When the war began. Iraq's participation was without prior planning. As soon as the battle broke out on the Egyptian and Syrian lands. Although Iraq was not notified of this war. Iraq commanded its forces to move directly to the Syrian borders to march a distance about (1000 - 1500) km. Specifically after the Iraqi president Ahmed Hassan Al-Baker phoned the Egyptian president Mohammed Anwar Al - Sadat and the Syrian president Hafez Assad to inform them of the participation and sending these forces. He also announced participation of airplanes alongside Syria. Where on the evening of 6-7 October 1973. The adequate ground forces were put with warning, taking a number of decisions and the most prominent of them as following :

- 1) Nationalization of the United States's share of Basra Oil Company and consider that a spark for an upcoming battle against America and its ally Israel because it is being the first supporter of this war
- 2) Speeding up to send many Iraqi armed forces, particularly on the ground to the northern front to support Syria ... and to stand side by side with them in this war against Israel
- 3) Returning quickly to restore relations with Iran, to start new negotiations with it, in order to largely secure the eastern front. So in response to this, Syria and Egypt welcomed the participation of Iraq. Where their active military role become strongest after participation of Iraqi hawk hunter aircraft, that is, along with Egyptian planes by striking against the Israeli forces.

On this basis, despite all the obstacles that the Iraqi forces faced in terms of transport, movement and distance. But they were able to strategically excel to go and participation. This is due to the success of the military mobilization process, the material and moral support that paved the way for its success as well as commitment of the forces that participated in this war with all military commands and good administrative preparation. Especially with regard to efforts to reach by land and try to overcome the difficulties that previously mentioned. Which

exceeded nearly (1. 000) kilometers . Where during it the Iraqi forces were able to support the Syrian forces and achieve ways to advance in the battle .. which ended

After Syria announced on 24 / 10 / 1973 its acceptance of a cease-fire, therefore, from this standpoint , the battle achieved .. positive results on the level of the fighting capacity of the Arab armies , including the Iraqi army which is regarded as third grade of Arab armies , despite its losses with 323 dead within third armored vehicle brigade , 137 tanks and about 26 aircraft . However it was able to solidify with the Arabs in this war . Which represented the fourth military confrontation between the Arab region and Israel which its security and foundations collapsed . So it was truly a clear path for the Arab-Israeli conflict which showed the Arab fighter on the confrontation, despite the fact that the war losses were exorbitant in terms of martyrs and equipment , but later achieved multiple paths for a peaceful settlement and to find a way out of this eternal conflict

Conclusion :

On this basis . It is possible to say that October war 1973 has constituted one of the difficult Arab military wars . Where in which the Arabs demonstrated their fighting spirit and diplomatic action as embodied in history. Whereas the Egyptian army was able to cross the Suez Canal and destroy the Bar Lev Line .. Perhaps the support of the Iraqi army in this war gave the extent of Arab solidarity to recover the legitimate rights and all the lands that were usurped by (Israel) .. So its stance on this battle was clear ... Especially if it considered it as a battle of all Arabs . Where after he strengthened its participation militarily ... Its response came by nationalizing the two American companies 'share in Basra Oil Company as part of use of oil as a weapon in the battle . And as a response to participation of the United States in its support of Israel. Hence the stance of Iraq come to prove its success in the eternal stance and to record an important period in the Arab-Israeli conflict in

order to remain its stance as a symbol that generations are proud of throughout history and ages. Which is represented in the refusal of defeat, surrender and continuing achieving victory and steadfastness. So it was truly a clear reality to restore the dignity and prestige of the Arab human being before a usurper entity who tried to displace thousands of Palestinians from their land , thus gave the initiative to Iraq firstly and to the Arab region secondly . Where it strengthened the morale spirit of the Iraqi forces participating in the battle . And it confirmed their military readiness, besides to the change in the balance of power between the participating countries supporting this war and the countries rejecting it . Which resulted in positive results for participation . Where the most important of which is compensation for what Arabs lost in the June 1967 setback . And ability to use oil as a weapon in the battle, especially after the unification of the Arab masses in confrontation and insistence on adhering to the Arab lands . And that the next will not be in the Sinai and the Golan only , but also in restoration of all the lands of Palestine . Whether near or far from the theater of combat actions in the manner of strategic surprise and neutralizing the air superiority that the Israeli forces are distinguished with it on the Egyptian and Syria fronts by relying on Russian air defense systems . Which were able to respond to all hostile attacks according to the theory of nationalism of the battle in which Iraq participated . As well as being a form of liberation movements that contributed to defeating the Israeli army and all its military capabilities in resolving the battle in favor of the Arabs and drawing the desired end

Margins :

- 1) Dr. Omar Al-Khatib, Egypt and the war with (Israel) 1952-1973, Freedom House for Printing, Baghdad, 1977, p. 189
- 2) Malek Khudhair Khalaf Kazem Al-Mahyawi, The United States of America and the International Crises in the Arab Region, Master Thesis, College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, 1993, p.145

- 3) Dr. Omar Al-Khatib, the previous source, pp. 187-188
- 4) Dr. Hala Abu Bakr Smoudi, The American Policy Toward the Arab (Israeli) Conflict 1967-1973, Edition 1, Center for Arab Unity, Doctoral Theses Series (4), Beirut, December 1983, p. 144
- 5) Same source, p. 145
- 6) William Rogers was the Secretary of State of the United States of America from 1969 until 1973
- 7) The draft included many conditions, including obligating Israel to withdraw from every inch of the occupied Arab territories, and upon completion of the withdrawal, Egypt would recognize Israel as an independent and sovereign state within its borders that were in place in 1967
- 8) The draft was drawn up on June 22, 1971 during the summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity, and included several points, most notably the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from the occupied Arab areas to the borders of June 4, as well as the organization's solidarity with Egypt
- 9) This project contains multiple foundations, including the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (a united Arab kingdom called by this name and it consists of two countries, including a Palestinian, it includes the West Bank and a Jordanian, and it consists of the East Bank
- 10) Omar Al-Khatib, previous source, p. 191
- 11) None, Armament in the Middle East and the October War, Center for Palestinian Studies, October 1974, translated from the Armament Balance magazine published by the Center for Strategic Studies, London, 1973-1974, p. 4
- 12) Same source, p. 320
- 13) Adel Abdul Ghaffar Khalil, previous source, p. 87
- 14) None, Yearbook of the Palestinian Question for the year 1973, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1st Edition, Beirut, Lebanon, 1976, p. 329
- 15) Anmar Latif Nassif Jassim, The Influence of the Zionist Lobby on the American Foreign Policy towards the Issue of the Arab-Zionist Conflict during the Period from 1973 to 1984, Master Thesis, College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, 1988, p. 190
- 16) To arm itself in the Middle East and the October War, previous source, p. 1
- 17) Retired Brigadier General Abd Al-Razzaq Muhammad Aswad, The Palestinian Encyclopedia, Volume Three, Zionist Military and Arab (Israeli) Wars, published and distributed by the Arab House of Encyclopedias, without date, p. 887
- 18) Munir Al-Hor and Tariq Al-Mousa, previous source, p. 136
- 19) Same source, p. 136
- 20) Resolution 242: It is the resolution issued on November 22, 1967, which states that the Security Council expresses its continuing concern about the dangerous situation in the Middle East and affirms the inadmissibility of acquiring land through war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in the region. For more, see: The Camp David Accord and its notification, documentary presentation, Institute for Palestine Studies, Studies Series No. (50), 1st Edition, Beirut, 1978, pg. 8
- 21) Dr. Omar Al-Khatib, previous source, p. 236
- 22) Same source, p. 236
- 23) Munir Al-Hor and Tariq Al-Mousa, the previous source, pp. 139-140
- 24) None, The October War, Studies in Sociopolitical Aspects, National Center for Social Research, Cairo, 190, p. 34
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- 26) Wiliam a. vugh, avab media and politics during the October war. The middle East Journal, vol. , number p. 312 . 1975
- 27) Dr. Rasem Muhammad Al-Jamal, Joint Arab Media, Study in International Arab Media, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1st Edition, 1985, pg 85

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- 35) Same source, p. 153
- 36) The Egyptian Republic Newspaper, No. (7190), September 2, 1973
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- 38) Al-Sayed Al-Shorbajy, Five chapters on the October War and the First Class, The Modern Arab Foundation, Cairo, 1947, p. 60
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